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Fifteen years have passed since the 
adoption of Security Council Resolution 
1325 on Women, Peace and Security, 
through which time the EU has grown as 
a security actor. The keys to produce a 
change in implementing gender 
mainstreaming in the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) are well 
known by member states; the EU and 
external implementation reports1  are 
repeated again and again, but real 
change requires real willingness on the 
part of member states, and leadership. 
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Crises and conflicts which directly or indirectly 
affect the interests of the European Union 
(EU) are increasingly complex and planning 
the strategies to prevent or to mitigate them is 
delayed by consensual decision-making. When 
military and civilian action is taken for conflict 
prevention and crisis management, in order to 
prepare the ground for long-term sustainable 
development, it is no longer enough to interact 
with civil society through local or international 
CIMIC activities during the execution phase of 
an operation; by then it is too late. This is one 
of the lessons learnt by ISAF in Afghanistan, 
and now NATO is experimenting how to 
integrate civilian organisations in its strategic 
planning from the very genesis of the concept 
of a mission; something that would have been 
unthinkable even a few years ago. 
 
In the EU, the approach is broader as there is 
a wider range of tools apart from the purely 
military. All CSDP missions, both military and 
civilian, whether joint, independent or 
combined with other actions of the CFSP, 
ECHO, DEVCO, the Instrument for Stability, 
the EU Delegations, etc., refer in their 
mandate to a desired end state in which the 
necessary conditions for the restoration of 
peace and stability and further development 
are met. 
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Whenever a society, which suffers from 
underdevelopment or conflict trauma, invests 
in security of and participation by women, 
development grows at a fast pace.  
 
It is obvious that activating the other 50% of 
the population is a catalyst for recovery and 
development in any post conflict situation. 
Security Council Resolution 1325 deals with 
the importance of protecting women, 
preventing any act of violence or 
discrimination against them and involving 
women in the peace and stabilisation process 
in their countries, in order to promote peace 
and development. 
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The aim is to enable the strategic influence of 
external actors, through a comprehensive 
approach in order to benefit from synergies. 
But this is difficult to put in practice. Among 
other things, this is because it requires a 
change of mind-set at all levels in the 
structures of both civilian and military, 
national and international planning, which 
resist change if there is insufficient short-term 
gain. 
 
If we add gender-mainstreaming as a 
requirement for politico-strategic planning, the 
equation becomes even more complicated, 
because the change of mind-set needed 
increases exponentially. This is partly due to 
structural difficulties, organisational cultures 
and even ideologies that have to be overcome, 
both individually and collectively.  
 
These areas of difficulty or resistance can be 
summarised as follows: 
• Different rate of change: Only 17 of the 28 EU 
members have adopted a national action 
plan for the implementation of UNSCR 
1325. The intrinsic culture of each 
member state causes them to interpret the 
level of priority differently, and therefore a 
different pace is applied. 
 
• Avoiding cultural interference: The 
implementation of a gender perspective in 
planning for external missions clashes with 
the established modus operandi. Any 
strategic planner could refute the notion of 
‘women empowerment’, interpreting that 
as triggering a shift in the culture of a 
society, something outside the purpose of 
any intervention, which therefore should 
not be part of the mission. But aren't we 
already influencing their culture, by 
imposing peace and development 
programmes offered in exchange of 
positive indicators?  
 
• Duration of the mission versus time of 
implementation: CSDP missions have a 
mandate limited in time so if there is no 
follow-on strategy, through development 
initiatives, the efforts invested in the 
gender implementation measures could be 
unexploited or even counterproductive. 
 
• Rejection of an imposed strategy: The gender 
perspective in civilian or military planning 
is not based on the traditional study of the 
evolution of tactics through space and time 
on the ground. It is a political imposition, 
through a series of UN resolutions2 based 
on UNSCR 1325, supporting the theory 
that by investing in equality and justice, 
and taking the necessary protection and 
participation of women in conflict 
resolution as a centre of gravity, the 
outcome of any strategy will improve. For 
many planners, this ‘top-down’ intrusion in 
strategic planning, which directly affects 
the operational decision-makers, is not 
convincing. It does not carry the know-
how of a tactical manual or Standard 
Operations Procedure, based on lessons 
learnt from the ground. There are indeed 
cases of good practice, but not directly 
related to external missions. In most cases 
the lack of knowledge on how to apply this 
approach in planning, due to a lack of 
training, gender advisors or just interest, 
leads planners to simplify the gender 
perspective to increasing the number of 
posts for women in missions, which 
creates confusion and even rejection. This 
is a grave mistake, as this is not about a 
new strategy at all, but a different approach 
to apply to any existing strategy. It is not 
about creating different lines of action, but 
reinforcing those which the Head of 
Mission or the Operation Commander has 
decided, in order to increase the effects 
required to achieve the desired end state of 
the political mission. Furthermore, the 
need to include more women in CSDP 
missions should be a means, not an end. 
Obviously having women in the planning 
teams and among staff deployed will be a 
multiplying factor, with greater rate in 
some missions than in others, but it is not 
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the goal of gender mainstreaming in 
missions and operations. 
 
• Perception of a political tool: Certainly, since 
Beijing 1995 a number of NGOs, with 
different political backgrounds, have 
promoted the need to empower women as 
a centre of gravity to be taken into account 
in conflict resolution. This is a fact, but 
considering them as the owners of 
Resolution 1325 is a mistake.3 This wrong 
perception, in many cases, provokes some 
sort of refusal from operational leaders 
who link the implementation of the gender 
approach with particular political interests 
other than the efficiency of their missions. 
 
The common factor in these areas of resistance 
is the need for a daunting change of mind-set 
in the planning of CSDP missions, in order to 
first understand and then accept the 
implementation of the gender approach. 
 
An example can better explain the value of this 
perspective. Let’s suppose a crisis in a country 
in Central Africa, in which the EU decided to 
intervene with a stabilisation mission, to 
support a democratic electoral process. 
Broadly, the military mission would be to 
provide protection to civilians during the 
elections by preventing violence in areas 
around the polling stations, proceeding with 
the withdrawal of arms, deterring, and if 
necessary as a last resort, intervening. 
Completely disjointed from the military 
mission, so as not to create confusion or 
partiality, a civilian mission would be 
responsible for monitoring the proper 
implementation of the electoral process 
according to the standards of transparency. 
However it could happen that women have 
very different security needs from that of men, 
as is usual in Africa, simply because they might 
be denied the freedom of movement to the 
ballot box, i.e. from camps for displaced 
persons. In conclusion, without an initial 
gender approach, the mission ‘to protect the 
citizens’ would only have been partially met. 
Indeed, there would have been no violence 
against men who had gone to vote, but the 
democratic process, without the participation 
of half of the population, could not be declared 
a success or even valid.4 
 
Gender mainstreaming in CSDP essentially 
adds a different approach. It is not a new 
strategy, nor a partisan subversive 
indoctrination, quite the contrary, is an 
inclusive vector. It's a matter of analysing, from 
the genesis of the mission, the potential 
advantages if we achieve that the 50% of the 
population with usually a greater sense of 
protection of the family as the group unit of 
society, is engaged and supports the effect that 
we want to produce. It is therefore a cross-
cutting factor to be taken fully into account in 
the ‘targeting’ and the planning process in 
general, to provide an added value to the 
ultimate effectiveness of the mission.5 
 
CONCLUSION 
Last May the EU member states agreed to 
include in the next revision of the EEAS 
structures, which would be held this autumn, 
the establishment of a high-level function 
dedicated for UNSCR 1325 and gender related 
matters.6 The person appointed to this new 
position must lead the necessary change of 
mind-set, monitor at first hand the 
implementation of gender mainstreaming from 
the Crisis Management Concept for a possible 
mission through planning, execution, and 
strategic review. To this end, s/he will have to 
face major challenges, such as: the involvement 
in the appointment of senior mission 
personnel, the lack of qualified staff in gender 
approach in the various planning teams, or the 
training needs of operational leaders and 
personnel deployed for the mission. All this to 
be overcome under the friction from the 
resistance areas mentioned above. It goes 
without saying that the success of her/his work 
will not only depend on her/his own 
leadership, but also on the authority s/he will 
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be granted and the support received by the 
European institutions and member states. 
 
Certainly the political momentum during this 
second semester of 2015 cannot be more 
appropriate due to two important events: the 
celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Beijing 
Conference, and of course the final review 
presentation of UNSCR 1325 (2000-2015) led by 
UNWOMEN. 
 
In this post-Lisbon Treaty period, the EU 
member states are asking for better 
implementation of gender mainstreaming in 
CSDP. The high-level function dedicated for 
UNSCR 1325 and gender related matters should 
assume leadership in a key process of change of 
mentality in the planning of CSDP missions at 
all levels, both individually and collectively. 
The creation of this new political post may be 
just a rhetoric attempt or, if a set of coherent 
measures (resources, staff, training, audit 
capacity...) to support this figure follows, it 
may be the beginning of the resolution of a 
complex equation, which only international 
actors with the required capacity and 
management tools, such as the EU in the area 
of CSDP, can resolve. 
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